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Abstract: FDI analysis is usually performed within the frame of the win-win hypothesis. However, 
we believe that certain circumstances (MNEs following their own business objectives, lack of 
appropriate regulations, non-observance of the arm’s length principle) may generate disproportionate 
advantages at the level of FDI stakeholders. The disequilibrium between reinvested profits and 
repatriated profits may be viewed as a proof of such disproportionate advantages of stakeholders 
involved in FDI. In addition to figures showing the comparison between reinvested and repatriated 
profits, as well as the way in which such indicators vary e.g. in case of abnormal business conditions 
(global economy collapse), we try to show that lack/misuse of transfer pricing regulations may 
generate even more disequilibrium, the MNEs using intra-group transactions as an additional way of 
repatriating non-taxable/low tax profits. 
Keywords: foreign direct investment; tax; transfer pricing; multinational enterprises; profit 
repatriation 
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1. Introduction 
The present paper investigates potential correlations between profit repatriation, 
transfer pricing regulations and the level of corporate income tax collection by the 
government of the host country, with focus on Romania.  
To begin with, we have presented an overview of the transfer pricing regulations 
worldwide, following which we have described the transfer pricing principles 
adopted in the Romanian legislation. The paper contains also an analysis of figures 
representing profits reinvested and repatriated during the period 2007-2011 in 
relation to Romanian FDI entities. To conclude, we have shown how MNEs may 
attempt to repatriate non-taxable/low tax profits by non-observance of the transfer 
pricing regulations and how the host country may secure the appropriate collection 
of tax. 
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2. Transfer Pricing Regulations 
Overview of Existing Transfer Pricing Regulations Worldwide 
In the frame of an increased integration of national economies and technological 
progress, particularly communication, an increasing role of multinational 
enterprises (“MNEs” hereinafter) in international trade has been recorded. In such 
context, practical difficulties arise for tax administrations regarding the allocation 
of profits between different tax jurisdictions particularly when referring to highly 
integrated group operations. On a related note, practical difficulties arise also at the 
level of MNEs, the latter being liable to comply with diverse and complex tax 
administrative requirements, leading most frequently to a greater administrative 
burden and higher compliance costs. Regarding the taxation of MNEs, 
governments’ major point of concern regards nowadays the proper 
adoption/application of transfer pricing regulations in the domestic tax legislation. 
In case of EU member states, the intention is to align, for now at least under a non-
formal way, the transfer pricing regulations and related documentation 
requirements.   
Transfer pricing refers in principle to a set of tax regulations regarding profit 
allocation methods used in order to split income and expenses, and therefore profits 
(or losses, as applicable) between entities characterized by an affiliation 
relationship. The concept of transfer prices refers to the prices applied under 
controlled commercial and financial circumstances between related (controlled) 
parties. Companies falling under the related party definition are most likely linked 
either by a significant share capital holding or control by one company in the other 
or by such a holding/control exercised by a third person (the holding/control must 
not be exercised directly). Branches and subsidiaries are a common example of 
entities considered under the control of a single corporation, the parent company. 
Certain tax jurisdictions consider entities to be under common control if they share 
family members on their boards of directors. Under the OECD doctrine, as a 
consequence of such holding/control relationship, conditions may be imposed or 
made in the commercial and financial relations between affiliated enterprises so 
that they would differ from those applicable in case of independent entities, thus 
conducting to a non-justifiable allocation of profits between the entities involved 
(in case of MNEs, between various tax jurisdictions).  
Transfer pricing is a matter that concerns both entities residing in the same tax 
jurisdiction as well as taxpayers from different tax jurisdiction. In the first case, tax 
authorities may consider appropriate to limit any abuse of shifting profits/losses 
between domestic taxpayers (it is acknowledged that potential tax advantages may 
be obtained by domestic groups e.g. by shifting the group’s profits towards the 
losses carrying entities). In case of transactions between related parties operating in 
different tax jurisdictions, even more complex tax implications may arise since 
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MNEs e.g. may be tempted to repatriate profits by means of transfer pricing (to be 
explained more in detail in the following sections of this paper). 
Transfer pricing refers to the price setting between related parties, analysis of the 
prices applied, documentation of the prices applied and potential adjustment of 
charges made between related parties for physical goods or intangible property.  
A significant number of governments
1
 have adopted transfer pricing regulations in 
their domestic tax legislation. In most countries, transfer pricing regulations 
adopted adhere to the arm’s length principle – according to which related parties 
transactions should be established by reference to prices applied in case of 
comparable transactions between two or more unrelated parties dealing at arm’s 
length. OECD has published guidelines on applying the arm's length principle
2
, 
which are followed, in whole or in part, by many tax jurisdictions (not only by 
those of the OECD members). The United States and Canadian transfer pricing 
rules are similar in many respects to the OECD guidelines, with certain points of 
material difference. There are however certain countries (e.g. Brazil and 
Kazakhstan) which implemented rules that are materially different overall. 
Transfer pricing regulations are not meant in principle at imposing at what prices 
should transactions be carried out by taxpayers. However, such rules offer the tax 
authorities the instruments necessary in order to adjust (only for tax purposes, at 
least as regards Romania) the profits taxable in Romania so to be in line with the 
arm’s length principle. Moreover, from the perspective of the taxpayer, transfer 
pricing aims at determining what constitutes arm's length prices and how to set 
intra-group transfer pricing policies so that the prices applied fall within the arm’s 
length range. A complex analysis should normally be performed by taxpayers with 
the view of comparing prices actually charged between related parties with prices 
or relevant profitability derived by independent entities from similar/comparable 
transactions. The rules generally require that functions, risks, tangible and 
intangible assets and terms of conducting unrelated party transactions or activities 
be reasonably comparable to such items with respect to the related party 
transactions or profitability being tested. 
In order to test intra-group transfer pricing applied, one of the following methods, 
where appropriate and supported by reliable data, may be applied: the comparable 
uncontrolled price method, the cost-plus method, the resale price method and 
profitability based methods (profit split and transactional net margin method). 
Different methods may be imposed by domestic legislations when testing goods by 
difference to those applied for services or use of property due to inherent 
differences in business aspects of such broad types of transactions. Specific 
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mechanisms for sharing or allocation of costs may also be particularly imposed 
when performed between related parties in order to reduce tax controversy. 
As regards the relationship between different tax jurisdictions, the treaties for the 
avoidance of double taxation normally provide for specific provisions regarding the 
cooperation of tax authorities in the tax field as well as on mechanisms for 
avoidance of double taxation in case of taxpayers. Also, advance pricing 
agreements between the taxpayer and the tax authority in its jurisdiction as well as 
between the taxpayer and tax authorities in various tax jurisdictions may be 
obtained in order to secure the transfer pricing policy applied. 
Transfer pricing documentations sustaining the application of the arm’s length 
principle in case of intra-group transactions may be required to be prepared either 
in advance, together with the submission of annual tax returns or upon tax 
authorities’ specific request. Administrative fines may be applied for non-
compliance, in addition to assessment of supplementary profits tax and late 
payment charges. As an alternative to the arm’s length principle, the global 
formulary apportionment, in substance accounting profit allocation method 
between the sub-national jurisdictions of the United States and Canada, may be 
used for the assessments of profits taxable between different tax jurisdictions. 
Advocates of such system sustain that under the formulary apportionment firms 
would no longer have an artificial tax incentive to shift income to low-tax 
locations. 
 
Overview of the Romanian Transfer Pricing Regulations 
Transfer pricing regulations were introduced in the Romanian Fiscal Code
1
 starting 
2005, however the focus of law makers and tax authorities on transfer pricing 
matters increased only starting 2008.  
According to the Romanian rules, in principle, in case of transactions between a 
Romanian taxpayer and related parties, the Romanian tax authorities may adjust the 
amount of income or expenses as necessary, in order to reflect the market value of 
the goods or services provided in the transactions and the arm’s length profits 
taxable in Romania. Subsequent law amendments were meant at clarifying that the 
transfer pricing regulations apply also in case of intra-group transactions carried 
out between domestic taxpayers. 
According to the Romanian Fiscal Code, an affiliation relationship is defined by at 
least one of the following cases: 
- two individuals qualify as related parties if such persons are spouses or 
relatives up to the third degree, inclusive; 
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- an individual is related with a legal entity if the individual owns, directly or 
indirectly, including holdings of related parties, a minimum of 25%, by value 
or by number, of the shares/units or voting rights in the legal entity, or 
effectively controls the legal entity; 
- two legal entities are related if at least: 
(i) the first legal entity holds, directly or indirectly, including holdings of 
related parties, a minimum of 25% of the value/number of shares/units or 
voting rights in the other legal entity or controls the legal entity; 
(ii) the second legal entity holds, directly or indirectly, including 
holdings of related parties, a minimum of 25% of the value/number of 
shares/units or voting rights in the first legal entity; 
(iii) a third party legal entity holds, directly or indirectly, including 
holdings of related parties, a minimum of 25% of the value/number of 
shares/units or voting rights both in the first and in the second legal 
entity. 
Romanian taxpayers are required to prepare a transfer pricing documentation to 
demonstrate that intra-group pricing complies with the arm’s length principle. The 
Romanian transfer pricing provisions have become effectively applicable by both 
tax authorities and taxpayers as of 2008 when Order 222/2008 on the content of the 
transfer pricing documentation file was adopted. 
The transfer pricing documentation file should comprise information regarding the 
taxpayer, the group and the related party transactions (including an analysis of 
functions performed and risks assumed by the related parties), as well as 
information on the transfer pricing method used for determining the value of 
related party transactions and a set of relevant statistical comparables 
(benchmarking analysis). 
The five transfer pricing methods specified in the OECD Guidelines are also 
accepted for Romanian transfer pricing purposes. The choice of the most 
appropriate transfer pricing method should be performed on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on inter-alia the nature of the controlled transaction analyzed, as 
established further to a functional analysis, the availability of reliable information 
on comparable uncontrolled transactions and the degree of comparability between 
controlled and uncontrolled transactions, including the reliability of comparability 
adjustments that may need to be performed. Subject to the availability of reliable 
comparable data, traditional transaction methods are preferred in practice to profit-
based methods. Local comparables are preferred, but Pan-European comparable 
sets are accepted in lack of domestic comparables. 
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Romanian entities performing transactions with related parties should make 
available upon request of tax authorities and within a required term, a file 
comprising the transfer pricing documentation for such transactions. The deadline 
for the submission of the transfer pricing documentation file to the tax authorities 
cannot exceed three months. Upon taxpayer’s written request, this deadline may be 
extended only once for a period equal to the one initially established.  
Non-submission or submission of an incomplete transfer pricing documentation 
file within the set deadline further to two consecutive requests from the tax 
authorities triggers the estimation by authorities of the transfer prices for the related 
party transactions (this is beside a fine for non-compliance of up to RON 14,000). 
The corresponding adjustments made after the estimation of the prices by the tax 
authorities may result in additional profits taxable at a rate of 16% and late 
payment charges/penalties. According to Government Decision no. 529/2007 
regarding the approval of advance pricing agreements and advance tax ruling, 
taxpayers engaged in transactions with affiliates can request the issuance of a 
unilateral, bilateral or multilateral advance pricing agreement (“APA”), subject to 
fees of either EUR 10,000 or EUR 20,000, depending on the type of APA 
requested. In a similar manner, the official term for issuing an APA is either of 12 
or 18 months, the longer period being provided in case of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements. APAs are mandatory against tax authorities only if their terms and 
conditions have been observed by the taxpayer. 
Taxpayers that entered into APAs for related party transactions are not required to 
prepare and submit a transfer pricing documentation file for the periods and 
transactions covered by such agreements. The statute of limitation period on 
assessment of transfer pricing adjustments is currently five years, excerpt for tax 
evasion or fraud, cases in which the statute of limitation period extends to 10 years. 
The Romanian Fiscal Code stipulates that the tax authority should consider the 
OECD Guidelines when analyzing the prices applied in related-party transactions. 
In addition, the legislation on transfer pricing documentation requirements is 
aligned to the EU Code of Conduct on transfer pricing documentation. 
 
Practical Considerations 
As a general remark, Romanian tax authorities are currently little sophisticated as 
regards transfer pricing matters. However, an increased focus on transfer pricing 
audits may be observed and would likely continue in the future given the increased 
complexity and spread of operations carried out by MNEs. One practical point of 
discussion concerns the current definition of related parties according to the 
Romanian transfer pricing regulations, which is not fully aligned to the OECD 
recommendations, law interpretation difficulties arising as regards the assessment 
of affiliation relationships between legal entities by means of common control held 
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by a natural person. Although tax authorities frequently adopt an aggressive 
approach during tax audits, the definition itself as currently included in the law 
apparently establishes an affiliation relationship between legal related parties only 
in case of holding/control exercised by a legal entity (thus excluding the case of 
common control by an individual). The Ministry of Finance, the public authority 
competent with tax law adoption and interpretation does not provide a clear 
interpretation of such matter, even if, any potential law interpretation issued would 
still remain unbinding towards the National Agency for Tax Administration, the 
public institution having the competency to perform transfer pricing audits. 
Separately from the above, the duly application of transfer pricing provisions by 
taxpayers recording losses may be scrutinized by tax authorities during tax audits 
since a history of losses may be a sign of inadequate allocation of profits e.g. 
between the non-resident mother company and the domestic subsidiary/branch. On 
a related note, during tax reimbursement audits, transfer pricing documentation 
requirements may be invoked by the tax authorities solely with the intention of 
delaying tax reimbursements.  
On the other hand, the Romanian subsidiaries of non-resident MNEs perform 
various inter-company transactions with their mother companies, the pricing 
applied in such cases being frequently not at all transparent or obviously arm’s 
length compliant. The nature of such transactions is not always easy to connect 
with the nature of the core business activities performed, especially when they 
involve numerous services renderings or interest/royalties payments. The concern 
in this respect is whether such payments for services rendered or intangible 
property is not in substance a way of low-tax profits repatriation, under the relevant 
international treaties for the avoidance of double taxation. 
 
3. Foreign Direct Investment 
Literature usually provides for an analysis of FDI from a win-win perspective for 
all stakeholders involved in the investing process. However, a correct evaluation of 
the social and economic efficiency of FDI should scrutinize the benefits, gains and 
costs generated by FDI for each participant on various time frames (meaning, on 
the short, medium and long run).  
In the following, the paper presents situations when the win-win hypothesis is no 
longer applicable in case of FDI participants as a consequence of misuse of transfer 
pricing practices. 
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Profit Repatriation 
The profitability and the revenues derived by MNEs further to FDI carried out in 
Romania are matters of interest not only to the MNE itself, seeking for new 
marketplaces or cheap but instructed labour force, but also for the host economy, 
hoping for positive spillover effects generated by the FDI. 
Certain particularities should be observed as regards the business behaviour of 
Romanian subsidiaries of foreign MNEs. As such, even if in theory the legal and 
tax regulations should not imply discrimination between local and foreign 
companies (even if at least the tax practice has proved the contrary in several 
cases), we may note certain differences as regards the level of profitability and the 
utilization of profits derived, i.e. either by reinvestment in the host-country or by 
repatriation to the home country.  
As a non-deniable rule, the level of the profits repatriated by MNEs are exceeding 
the level of profits reinvested in the host country at least on a medium and long 
run, which, even if may trigger the conclusion that the foreign investors derive 
higher benefits further to running FDI, the facts are supported by the inner 
motivation of foreign investors, respectively of deriving profits (developing a 
business in a foreign country would likely qualify as circumstantial facts). 
There are certain facts supported with empirical evidence that should be 
mentioned. Thus, it is obvious for example that the host country may not influence 
in any way the level of the reinvested/repatriated profits by foreign MNEs. It 
cannot be denied that certain incentives may be granted as regards reinvested 
profits (e.g. as applicable up to 31 December 2010, Romanian tax law provided for 
tax exemption of profits reinvested in acquisition of new equipments) as an attempt 
for limiting profits repatriation, however, on the long run, the foreign investors 
seek for full recovery of their investment (including any reinvested profits). 
Table 1. The reinvested and repatriated profits in/from Romania by FDI entities 
during 2007 – 2011 
Formula FDI indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
(a) Net FDI profits  6.412 4.496 4.222 4.710 
(b) Net FDI losses  4.108 4.277 4.495 5.132 
(c) = (a) – (b) Net share 
capital 
participation 
4.084 2.304 219 - 273 -422 
(d) Net interest 
income 
266 634 475 764 833 
(e) = (c)+(d) Net income of 
foreign 
investors 
4.350 2.938 694 491 411 
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(f) Distributed 
dividends 
2.757 2.696 1.608 1.970 2.075 
(g)=(c)-(f) Reinvested 
profits 
1.327 -392 -1.389 -2.243 -2.497 
(h)=(d)+(g) Repatriated 
profits 
3.023 2.546 2.083 2.734 2.908 
Source: BNR (www.bnr.ro) 
Based on the figures presented in the above table, certain conclusions can be easily 
drawn. First of all, under normal business conditions (i.e. 2007, before the 
economic crisis), the level of repatriated profits was up to three times higher than 
the level of reinvested profits. During the period 2008 – 2011, we can observe a 
significant drop of the net income derived by foreign investors from FDI run in 
Romania, in line with the global economy collapse, however, in 2011 repatriated 
profits slowly redressed up to the level recorded in 2007 (based on massive 
domestic disinvestments and increase of interest income from intra-group 
financing).  
Based on the above figures, the behaviour of foreign investors regarding Romanian 
FDI can be characterized by the following: 
- significantly higher levels of repatriated profits (up to three times) in 
comparison to reinvested profits; 
- a continuous drop of net share capital participation as a result of scarce 
financial liquidities; 
- an increased level of net interest income paid by Romanian FDI to foreign 
investors as a result of disinvestment and inter-company funding;   
- a decreasing net income of foreign investors from Romanian FDI given the 
two components mentioned above; 
- levels of distributed dividends and repatriated profits tending to equalize 
after the crisis overcome; 
- an accelerated disinvestment process proven by the negative levels of 
reinvested profits starting 2008. 
The empirical data presented above sustains the ideas presented earlier according 
to which the various stakeholders obtain disproportionate advantages further to FDI 
performance, especially since FDI is fully controlled by foreign investors, acting 
solely with the view of deriving satisfactory profits from host countries to be 
subsequently repatriated.  
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The figures presented in the above table represent in principle the accounting 
figures (profits) declared by Romanian FDI entities under statistical analysis by the 
National Bank of Romania and the National Statistics Institute. However, the 
accounting figures of host country FDI entities may sometimes reflect the result of 
controlled transactions. Irrespective of the key drivers based on which MNEs chose 
Romania as a location for implementing FDI, the group’s activities are often 
structured so that almost all transactions involving the domestic company be 
carried out with related parties (e.g. in case of manufacturing activities, acquisition 
of raw materials and sale of finished products, as core transactions, are carried out 
with group companies). Under such conditions, it may not be the MNEs interest to 
allocate a significant/justifiable portion of profits to the Romanian partner since 
such profits would normally be taxable herein both at company as well as 
shareholders’ level. As such, domestic FDI entities may find themselves acquiring 
e.g. raw materials at significantly higher prices and selling finished products under 
market price to group companies (we have seen in practice situations when raw 
materials price before processing by the Romanian FDI entity was higher than the 
actual product sale price).  
Such behavior of MNEs may be convenient since, in the end, the intention, as 
already proved, would be to repatriate profits (under such example Romanian taxes 
being evaded). Similar examples may be given as regards services renderings by 
mother companies to Romanian FDI entities (in particular management, 
consultancy but also administrative services) and royalties payments in relation to 
brand, know-how, intangibles in general at prices higher than the actual market 
price. There could be cases where the services would not actually be rendered by 
the mother company or the services would not have been acquired under normal 
business conditions by the Romanian FDI entity. The above would likely generate 
non-justifiable expenses at the level of the Romanian FDI entity with a direct 
impact on the accounting and tax profit. In the light of the above, the transfer 
pricing regulations should give the Romanian tax authorities the means and the 
powers to adjust the tax position of the Romanian FDI entity so that, at least, the 
right amount of profits be taxed in Romania. 
The Romanian tax authorities are yet little sophisticated on transfer pricing matters 
while intra-group transactions are increasingly complex. There is currently an 
increased interest on transfer pricing matters given the estimated tax collection 
involved. The control of the tax authorities on non-observance of transfer pricing 
principles should nonetheless have no accounting impact at the level of the 
Romanian FDI entity and on the level of the profits repatriated. 
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4. Conclusion 
Empirical evidence proves that under normal business operations, MNEs repatriate 
a large amount of profits derived from host countries. Under the same pattern, 
MNEs involve in significant disinvestment in case of economy collapse and scarce 
financial liquidities, however the repatriated profits remain positive (mostly as a 
consequence of the interest income derived from intra-group financing).  What 
statistical data available showed may not be the actual level of profits repatriated 
by MNEs.  
A category of intra-group transactions carried out by MNEs in host countries may 
only aim at affecting the accounting and tax position of the local FDI entity (profits 
are repatriated if such transactions are carried out other than at arm’s length). 
Services renderings (especially management, consultancy, administration), royalty 
payments, but also transactions involving tangible goods are carried out at financial 
and commercial conditions imposed by MNEs. Transfer pricing regulations do not 
have nor intend to have the power to constraint the MNEs on how to use their 
profits (reinvestment versus repatriation), however, such rules try to assure that the 
appropriate amount of tax is collected in Romania in relation to MNEs host country 
operations.  
Romanian tax authorities increased focus on transfer pricing matters has conducted 
to transfer pricing adjustments in 2010 of EUR 8.5m, while the single highest 
adjustment performed by the tax authorities in 2011 amounted to as much as EUR 
30m. The collected tax further to transfer pricing audits is likely to further increase 
in the future. Transfer pricing regulations are one of host countries means of 
reducing the apparent disproportionate advantages derived by MNEs further to 
carrying out FDI. 
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